Does the distribution of religious belief suggest a natural source?

Friends, Romans, Countrypersons,

You will realize by looking at the calendar that September is almost upon us. For people like myself who make our nickel in the classroom, this means a crunch time getting ready for a new semester. But even so, you will still see me struggling mightily to keep the storefront at the Tentative Apologist Department Store with fresh displays every two or three days.

With that I turn to Silver Bullet who was so impressed with the argument of Stephen Maitzen that he quoted it in the last thread. The drift of the quote seems to be that the distribution of religious belief around the globe suggests that religious belief is purely a product of culture. Now I thought we had already dispensed with this claim when I critiqued John Loftus's argument and yet here it is again, gussied up for another round. But enough of me. Here's Maitzen:

"consider the clustered distribution of theistic belief around the world that I referred to a moment ago and think of the two rival explanations of that distribution that are now on offer. On the one hand you’ve got naturalistic explanations that cite messy and haphazard factors like human conquest and politics, and on the other hand you’ve got an explanation that presupposes this innate god-given human faculty that for some reason works splendidly in [Mexico] and works terribly in Cambodia. And no innate capacity of course that we know of will stack geographic boundaries in that way."

Based on this Silver Bullet asks: "do you believe that the clustered distribution of religious belief around the world is best explained by God working through his God given sensus divinitatus or by factors that have nothing to do with God at all? That is, is the clustered distribution of properly basic Christian belief around the globe indistinguishable from that explained by purely naturalistic explanations?"

My answer which, due to shortness of time, is missing the pearls and ribbon that I regularly stitch into my prose, is as follows:

First, Maitzen sets up false alternatives akin to the Chicago school economist who says we either privatize the military, fire department and police service or embrace the hammer and sickle. Why can't it be the case that in some cases religious beliefs arise, at least in part, from a non-natural source and at other times not? I have never met a theologian who would deny that many religious beliefs are the result of "messy and haphazard factors like human conquest and politics". But how does one move to the conclusion that this is all that is ever at work?

Second, while I think the inference to the best explanation is a good way to go about the assesment of worldviews, it is astounding to think that such a study of naturalism vs. supernaturalism can be carried out in a short paragraph based on what seems most likely to a person to be the case. This is highly subjective and question-begging.

This brings me to my third point. The possibilty that religious beliefs might, at least in part, have a non-natural source is increased to the degree that a person thinks naturalism is false such that there is a non-natural agency that could possibly be the source of such beliefs. On this issue I'll make two points. First, there are no good grounds to accept naturalism, and that is not for wont of many of my readers trying. (The best effort thus far seems to be: science explains a lot so let's think it can explain everything.) Second, there are good grounds to accept the existence of entities that are non-natural including the Leibnizean cosmological argument, the Kalaam cosmological argument, the moral argument, the argument from reason, the argument from the origin of biological information, the argument from cosmic fine-tuning, and so on.

Fourth, Maitzen refers to a "sensus divinitatis". That's Plantinga's terminology, not mine.

I could go on but September is marching closer, second by second, and with it the need to prepare new course preps.