Yahweh vs. Zeus Part 3: The Battle Continues

It is a common complaint of atheists, humanists, agnostics, skeptics, and various other grumblers against theistic belief, that there is something arbitrary about such belief. ConverseAtheist has been hammering on this point for awhile now, focusing in particular on Zeus. That is, if I believe in the Christian God, why not believe in the Greek God as well? Or why not the Greek God instead of the Christian God?

It would seem that from ConverseAtheist's perspective, the basic problem, I suppose, is arbitrariness.

Here's an analogy. Let's say that I affirm belief in snorgs. "What's a snorg?" you ask, somewhat puzzled.

I reply: "A snorg is a fuzzy little ball shaped creature, about the size of my fist."

Nervously you press on. "Can I see a snorg?"

"No," I answer, "they are indetectable to the senses. But they're there. In fact, they're in the room with us right now."

"Okey dokey," you reply. "But if you're going to believe in snorgs, then why not sprites and faires as well? And unicorns and keebler elves for good measure? I mean, what's the limit?"

This seems to be the basic problem for ConverseAtheist. Or at least it is one of the problems. Why believe in Yahweh and not Zeus?

ConverseAtheist has recently done an admirable job at recapping the discussion (see the thread in "Is evil a disproof for Christianity?") and then seeking to push it forward. He quotes one of my reasons for believing in Yahweh but not Zeus as follows: "Now it strikes me as very plausible that if there is a most perfect being then he/she/it would be likely to reveal him/her/itself to those created beings able to comprehend that revelation (e.g. human beings)."

ConverseAtheist correctly infers the following from my claim: "So, since it is plausible that the perfect creator being of the universe would like to reveal itself to the created beings, one of the gods that humanity currently believes in is more likely to be correct than a god that humanity currently does not believe in. Right?"

I heartily agree.

Next he asks: "Does this count, in your book, as a defeater to Bob's belief in Zeus?"

And now I'm adding a new comment. Yes, I count it a defeater, though I'll admit it is not a knock down defeater.

And with that ConverseAtheist sets his iron leg hold trap (while I'm the mink). Here is his argument, though I have taken the liberty of numbering his propositions:

(1) Assuming that there is a perfect creator of the universe, It would either want Its precise existence known to humanity, or not want it known.

(2) If the perfect creator of the universe has a want and the ability to bring about the situation, Its desire obtains.

(3) Since humanity is far from having a coherent, consistent, non-contradictory idea of the precise nature/existence/attributes about the perfect creator of the universe, the perfect creator of the universe must not want Its precise existence known to humanity.

(4) Therefore, the number of humans who believe in a particular god is irrelevant toward gaining justification for that particular god, unless all or nearly all people have a coherent, consistent, non-contradictory idea of the same particular god.

With this argument ConverseAtheist seems to be aiming to proffer a defeater for my argument that belief in Yahweh is more justified than other beliefs in other gods (at least ones nobody believes in, like Zeus). The defeater is that if there were a most perfect being, that being would guarantee some sort of substantial cognitive apprehension of his attributes among the majority of human beings, but that has not happened so there is no such being.

As a reconstruction, that is a bit of a guess on my part since the argument is enthymemic, that is, it has embedded premises. In particular, there is a grand leap from (3) to (4) that needs to be articulated.

But rather than attempt to reconstruct the argument, I'll explain why I think it is way off, even in present form.

So ConverseAtheist seems to believe that God would necessarily provide a "coherent, consistent, non-contradictory idea of the precise nature/existence/attributes about the perfect creator of the universe." But there are all sorts of problems here. For instance, it may be that human minds are not able to grasp the full set of attributes that ConverseAtheist says we must. After all, we are finite, limited creatures; is it really such a stretch to think that we might not be able to grasp a complete theoretical articulation of God?

And what would be the point of such knowledge? I mean, somebody could grasp that and still hate God. Surely God is more concerned with our having knowledge of acquaintance -- or of relationship -- than mere head knowledge.

And so far as the head knowledge goes, we find an admirable, even if incomplete, summary of the basic nature and attributes of God from the mainstream, orthodox Christian tradition (i.e. "classical theism"). Why think something more than this is required? So I see no reason at all to accept the demand that most people must have a complete theory of God.

In conclusion, this means that I see no reason to accept this putative defeater to my argument in defense of belief in Yahweh over belief in gods not widely believed in (like Zeus).